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What the Marriage Equality Cases Tell Us 
About Voter ID 
Ellen D. Katzt 
Two years ago, United States u. Windsor1 tossed out the 
Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA").2 Thereafter, proponents of 
marriage equality secured dozens of notable victories in the 
lower courts, a smattering of setbacks,3 and last June, the 
victory they sought in Obergefell u. Hodges. 4 
During this same period, opponents of electoral restrictions 
such as voter identification have seen far less sustained success. 
Decided the day before Windsor, Shelby County u. Holder5 
scrapped a key provision of the Voting Rights Act (''VRA") while 
making clear that plaintiffs might still challenge disputed voting 
regulations under Section 2 of the VRA and the Constitution 
itself.6 The litigation that followed produced a select number of 
pro-plaintiff rulings, 7 all of which have now been stayed8 or 
t Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to 
Mary Shelly for excellent research assistance and to the University of Michigan Law 
School, which provided generous financial support for this project through the Cook 
Endowment. 
1 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
2 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
3 See, e.g., Freedom to Marry, Marriage Rulings in the Courts, available at 
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/marriage-rulings-in-the-courts, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8LCC-4GMT (updated Jan. 27, 2015), . 
4 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
5 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
6 See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
7 See Ohio State Conference of NAACP. v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808 (S.D. Ohio 
2014), aff'd Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014); 
Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014); Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 
2014 WL 5090258 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014); see also League of Women Voters of N.C. v. 
North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014). For plaintiff successes in state law 
challenges to electoral restrictions, see Martin v. Kohls, 444 S.W.3d 844 (Ark. 2014); 
Applewhite v. Pennsylvania, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2014 WL 184988, at *17 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. Jan. 17, 2014). 
8 See North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014); 
Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2014) (staying district court order); Frank v. 
Walker, 769 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2014) (staying district court order); Veasey v. Perry, 135 
S. Ct. 9 (2014) (denying motion to vacate stay); Husted v. Ohio State Conference of the 
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overruled by higher courts.9 The Supreme Court has yet to rule 
decisively, 10 but its rulings to date portend a rough road ahead 
for the voting plaintiffs. 11 
The voting and marriage cases since Windsor and Shelby 
County raise distinct questions and neither is controlling nor 
even applicable precedent for the other. This Article 
nevertheless considers the prospect that these cases have not 
proceeded wholly independently of one another, and, more 
specifically, that the marriage cases decided between Windsor 
and Obergefell shaped the trajectory of the voting disputes. The 
goal is not to prove the existence of such influence, but instead 
to use the prospect of it as a lens through which to examine 
various linkages between the two lines of cases.12 
Like the marriage plaintiffs, the voting plaintiffs allege that 
the regulations they challenge significantly burden a 
fundamental right; that the state interests offered in defense are 
inadequate; and that intentional discrimination based on race 
and sex is present and relevant. In the marriage cases leading 
up to Obergefell, courts were inclined to deem the burden on the 
implicated right severe, the state interests unworthy, and the 
animating intent problematic. More deference, by contrast, has 
been given to state decision-making in the voting cases. 
This greater deference stems, in part, from the familiar 
distinction between discriminatory intent and discriminatory 
effect, with the challenged voting rules often understood to fall 
into the latter, more deferentially reviewed category. 13 But not 
all of the voting rules recently challenged may be so 
characterized. A federal court ruling finding that intentional 
racial discrimination underlies the contested Texas voter ID 
NAACP, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014) (granting application to for stay); see also Green Party of 
Tenn. v. Hargett, No. 2:13-cv-224 at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 20, 2014), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/208815196/TN-Opinion-on-Voter-ID, archived at, http:// 
perma.cc/47CH-X6QZ (rejecting challenge to Tennessee Voter ID measure). 
9 Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014). 
10 See Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015). 
11 See, e.g., Frank v. Walker, No. 14-803, 2015 WL 131119, at *l (U.S. Mar. 23, 
2015); Veasey, 135 S. Ct. at 9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Husted, 135 S. Ct. at 42 
(Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJ., dissenting). 
12 For a discussion of another way Shelby County and Windsor are connected, see 
Bertran L. Ross, The State as Witness: Windsor, Shelby County, and Judicial District of 
the Legislative Record, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2027 (2014). 
13 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
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provision stands among the pro-plaintiff, post-Shelby County 
decisions that are presently inoperative. 14 As a result, the line 
separating intent from effect cannot alone explain the greater 
degree of deference accorded to state action in the voting cases. 
Instead, this deference may reflect a less noticed, but deeply 
consequential fault line emerging within the category of conduct 
captured by the label of "intentional discrimination." This line 
separates conduct that targets members of a minority group for 
disfavored treatment based on animus from conduct that targets 
them for more particularized, instrumental reasons. The 
distinction, which builds on the foundation set in Shelby County, 
resurrects and recasts a line between invidious and benign 
intentional discrimination, isolating animus for condemnation, 
and functionally immunizing more instrumental conduct that 
imposes disfavored treatment for reasons other than the 
expression of bigotry. 
This distinction-presently suggested by existing case law 
but yet to be fully operationalized-is unwarranted. State action 
crafted to impose significant and selective burdens on members 
of minority groups has long been understood as the cause of 
enduring injury, regardless of whether the underlying intent is 
grounded animus or more calculated concerns. 15 Deploying the 
distinction to cabin actionable discrimination caricatures is how 
unchecked discrimination operated prior to the civil rights 
movement and the shape it has taken ever since. It shields a 
good deal of conduct that has long fallen within the category of 
intentional discrimination and has long been seen as the cause 
of disadvantage. 
The distinction also obscures a critical observation 
repeatedly made in the marriage cases leading to and including 
Obergefell itself that should apply in the voting disputes but has 
yet to find expression. Same-sex marriage bans are now 
understood to inflict a dignitary harm on same-sex couples by 
denying them the ability to participate in marriage as opposite-
sex couples do as a matter of course. Many of the voting 
restrictions challenged post-Shelby County might be understood 
to inflict a similar dignitary harm. Onerous voter ID measures, 
for instance, force voters who lack conventional ID to traverse 
14 See Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014); 
see also infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
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numerous hurdles in order to cast a ballot in the same manner 
as voters who acquired qualifying ID for other purposes are able 
to do without thought or effort. Such measures make voting an 
ordeal for distinct groups of voters and, while they may not 
wholly preclude participation, deny these voters the public 
recognition that comes from casting a ballot 
"without hindrance."16 
To date, however, the concept of dignity plays no 
meaningful role in the voting disputes. Courts that have found 
for the voting plaintiffs focus on the tangible costs challenged 
voting restrictions impose rather than the affront to dignitary 
interests they might be understood to inflict. The critical way 
dignity has been deployed in the marriage cases leading up to 
and including Obergefell nevertheless suggests that the concept 
should have traction in the voting disputes as well. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the ways in 
which the voting and marriage plaintiffs have pressed 
structurally similar claims and the greater degree of deference 
accorded to state action in voting cases. Part II argues that an 
emerging and deeply flawed distinction between animus-based 
and more calculated intentional discrimination may explain the 
different levels of deference accorded in the two lines of cases. 
Part III suggests that the challenged voting regulations might 
be seen to inflict a dignitary harm that resembles the dignitary 
injury same-sex marriage bans are now understood to impose. It 
offers some preliminary thoughts on the contours of this injury 
and the challenges its recognition might present. 
I. LINKING THE VOTING AND MARRIAGE CLAIMS 
Handed down twenty-four hours apart, Shelby County v. 
Holder17 and United States v. Windsor18 both struck down 
federal statutes, but emphasized plaintiffs might still pursue 
federal claims to challenge at least some of the state conduct 
regulated by the invalidated statutes. Shelby County stated that 
conduct of the sort Congress targeted in its 2006 
Reauthorization of the VRA might still be actionable under 
16 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
17 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
18 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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Section 2 of the VRA and the Constitution itself. 19 Windsor, in 
turn, invalidated DOMA as an intrusion on state power while 
suggesting that bans on same-sex marriage might deny same-
sex couples equal protection and due process of law. 20 
From the start, these claims shared broad structural 
similarities. This Part focuses on two: the contentions that the 
challenged state regulations significantly burden a fundamental 
right and that the state interests offered to justify the 
challenged regulations are (or were) either insufficiently weighty 
or wholly implausible. Courts evaluating these claims have, 
overall, accorded more deference to state action in the voting 
disputes than in the marriage cases leading to Obergefell. 
A. Weighing the Burden 
In the litigation that followed Windsor, the marriage 
plaintiffs have repeatedly established a significant burden on 
the right to marry despite the availability of civil unions or 
domestic partnerships that provide many, albeit hardly all, of 
the benefits of marriage. Meanwhile, the voting plaintiffs have 
been called upon to show that a challenged regulation leaves 
them wholly unable to vote. Alternative means of participation, 
including far more difficult means, must be entirely unavailable. 
Since Windsor, the marriage plaintiffs were remarkably 
successful in persuading courts that bans on same-sex marriage 
significantly burden the right to marry.21 Courts consistently 
agreed that such bans deny same-sex couples numerous tangible 
and intangible benefits of marriage. They observed, inter alia, 
that "[m]arriage confers respectability on a sexual relationship;" 
that excluding a couple from marriage "denies it a coveted 
status,"22 and its children "the recognition essential to stability, 
predictability, and dignity"23 and thus labels these families "as 
second-class."24 Even Deboer u. Snyder,25 which upheld several 
19 Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2630--31. 
20 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct.at 2693, 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also generally 
Neil S. Siegel, Federalism as a Way Station: Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion, 
6 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 87 (2014). 
21 See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014). 
22 Id. at 658, 670. 
23 Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1215 (10th Cir. 2014). 
24 Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 472-73 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Bostic v. Schaefer, 
760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014) (Same-sex marriage ban "prohibits [same-sex couples] 
from participating fully in our society, which is precisely the type of segregation that the 
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same-sex marriage bans, refused to "deny the costs" those bans 
imposed on the plaintiffs, observing that they "den[y] gay 
couples the opportunity to publicly solemnize, to say nothing of 
subsidize, their relationships under state law ... depriv[ing] 
them of benefits that range from the profound . . . to 
the mundane."26 
Notably, these courts held that civil unions and domestic 
partnerships did not mitigate the burden that bans on same-sex 
marriage imposed. They deemed these marriage "lite" regimes 
inadequate substitutes for the full panoply of benefits and 
respectability marriage accords. 27 One district court, for 
instance, observed that "even if the tangible benefits of a 
domestic partnership are similar to marriage, creating a 
'separate but equal' institution still connotes a second-
class status."28 
In the voting context, a number of lower courts have 
similarly found that challenged electoral regulations 
significantly burden voting rights. 29 For example, district courts 
in Wisconsin and Texas observed that voters who lacked 
compliant ID under state law found obtaining such ID involved 
Fourteenth Amendment cannot countenance."); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 
478 (E.D. Va. 2014) (same sex marriage ban "needlessly stigmatiz[es] and humiliate[s] 
children" being raised by same-sex couples and "needlessly deprive[s them] of the 
protection, the stability, the recognition and the legitimacy that marriage conveys"). 
25 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014). 
26 Id. at 407-08. But see Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp.3d 910, 919, 923 (E.D. 
La. 2014) (holding that same sex couples in Louisiana experience no significant burdens 
to their constitutional rights given that "Louisiana's laws apply evenhandedly to both 
genders-whether between two men or two women" and that "[t]here is simply no 
fundamental right, historically or traditionally, to same-sex marriage"). 
27 See, e.g., Baskin, 766 F.3d at 670 (noting that "the rights and obligations of 
domestic partners are far more limited than those of married persons"); Obergefell v. 
Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 975 (S.D. Ohio 2013) rev'd sub nom., DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 
388 (noting statements in legislative history acknowledging that compared to marriage, 
domestic partnerships would not "have all the bells and whistles," "[p]erhaps don't have 
all the opportunities," and do not appear "equal to everyone else's"). 
28 Wolfv. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1005-06 (W.D. Wis. 2014). 
29 Plaintiffs must make this claim whether they are challenging electoral 
restrictions as unconstitutional burdens on the right to vote or as violations of the VRA 
Section 2. Section 2 proscribes electoral practices that result in a denial or abridgement 
of the right to vote on the basis of race or membership in a protected group, and it 
requires plaintiffs to show that they have less ability to participate and elect 
representatives than do white voters, a standard that is established through the totality 
of circumstances. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 
1011-12 (1994). In practice, this inquiry requires plaintiffs to establish many of the same 
elements that they must show to establish a constitutional violation under the Burdick-
Anderson balancing test. 
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numerous time-consuming and costly tasks,30 and that the 
opportunities to vote without such ID were themselves 
onerous.31 Similarly, both a district and appellate court held 
that reduced opportunities for early in-person voting ("EIP") in 
Ohio significantly burdened African-American and low-income 
voters, groups who had been more likely to use EIP voting than 
white, higher income voters.32 This burden was mitigated 
neither by the availability to vote by mail, 33 nor by the prospect 
that some affected voters would still cast ballots. 34 So too, North 
Carolina's elimination of same-day registration and out-of-
precinct voting was understood to impose a significant burden 
on African-American voters,35 the appellate court found no need 
30 See Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854-62 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (discussing 
steps required to secure compliant ID); Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 
5090258, at *21 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014); id. at *48 (noting fees and "the extra, often 
lengthy, trips" required to secure, "the absence of guidance the State provided on the 
requirements" and the choice it imposed between "go[ing] to work or go[ing to] get a 
photo ID;" see also Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(noting costs "deliberately imposed by the State," that are "at odds" with precedent, and 
that are "not small"). 
31 See Frank, 17 F. Supp. at 854-62; see also Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 785 
(7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting) (noting state required photo ID for first time 
absentee voters, those who changed addresses or their name for marriage or other 
reason); Veasey, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258, at *21, *48 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014) 
(describing creation of "a second class of voters who can only vote by mail" and that 
obtaining "free" state ID still required costs to provide underlying documents, 
transportation, the prospect of being fingerprinted and overcoming widespread 
impression that process involved screening for outstanding warrants). Cf Veasey v. 
Perry, 769 F.3d 890, 896 (5th Cir. 2014) (granting stay despite recognition that 
individual voter plaintiffs may be harmed by its decision). 
32 See Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808, 838, 841-42 
(S.D. Ohio 2014) (finding the burden significant and noting absence of EIP evening hours 
and the reduction of Sunday voting to a single Sunday despite widespread black voter 
participation in Sunday "souls to polls" initiatives). 
33 See id. at 827-28 (noting evidence that voting by mail was complex, prone to 
produce disqualifying errors, and mistrusted by the voters most affected by the reduction 
in EIP). 
34 See id. at 851 (grounding Section 2 violation in fact that "reductions to EIP 
voting ... result in fewer voting opportunities for African Americans than other groups 
of voters, as it will be more difficult for African Americans to vote during the days and 
hours currently scheduled than for members of other groups."); see also Ohio State 
Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 541-44 (6th Cir. 2014). 
35 See N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 348-49 
(M.D. N.C. 2014) (crediting evidence that African-American voters used SDR "at a higher 
rate than whites in the three federal elections during which SDR was offered"); League 
of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 247 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding 
that plaintiffs were likely to succeed with claim). 
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for plaintiffs to demonstrate they "cannot register or vote under 
any circumstance."36 
These rulings, however, have all since been stayed,37 and 
one has been overruled on its merits.38 The merits opinion, 
written by Judge Frank Easterbrook, stated that Wisconsin's 
voter ID imposed, at most, a minimal burden.39 Judge 
Easterbrook posited that many Wisconsin voters lacking the 
requisite identification would not vote for reasons unrelated to 
their lack of ID, while others without ID were simply "unwilling 
to invest the necessary time" to obtain a qualifying ID.40 By 
contrast, a legally significant burden on the right to vote arose 
only when voters were or would be wholly unable to accomplish 
what the law requires them to do. 41 
The suggestion that impermissible burdens arise only when 
eligible voters are categorically unable to vote stems from the 
Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Crawford u. Marion County 
Board of Elections. 42 That decision rejected a constitutional 
challenge to Indiana's voter ID law, deeming the burden the 
requirement imposed on most voters to be inconsequential, and 
the special burden it imposed on particularly disadvantaged 
voters indeterminate.43 Justice Stevens's plurality opinion 
nevertheless left open the prospect that some plaintiffs might 
yet successfully challenge the law as applied to them, but did 
not fully explain what such plaintiffs would need to show 
to prevail. 44 
36 League of Women Voters of N.C., 769 F.3d at 243 (stating that "waiving off 
disproportionately high African American use of certain curtailed registration and voting 
mechanisms as mere 'preferences' that do not absolutely preclude participation" an 
abuse of discretion); N.C. State Conference, 997 F. Supp. at 350-51 (''That voters 
preferred to use SDR over these methods does not mean that without SDR voters lack 
equal opportunity."). 
37 See Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014) (denying motion to vacate stay); Veasey v. 
Perry, 769 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2014) (staying district court order); Frank v. Walker, 769 
F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2014) (staying district court order); see also Frank v. Walker, 135 S. 
Ct. 7 (2014). 
38 See Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 2014). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 749 (suggesting "that people who do not plan to vote also do not go out of 
their way to get a photo ID that would have no other use to them"). 
41 Id. at 746-48, 753. 
42 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 187, 202 (2008). 
43 Id. at 198-99. 
44 Id. at 202-03. 
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The opinion made clear that successful plaintiffs would need 
to provide more information on the burden imposed by the 
measure than the plaintiffs had provided in Crawford. Justice 
Stevens held, for instance, that the evidence in the case did not 
show that any voter "will have his or her right to vote unduly 
burdened" by the ID requirement, and said "virtually nothing 
about the difficulties faced by either indigent voters or voters 
with religious objections to being photographed."45 And yet, the 
opinion also intimated that plaintiffs could not prevail unless 
they demonstrated a complete inability to vote. Justice Stevens, 
for example, observed that the record evidence did not document 
"a single, individual Indiana resident who will be unable to vote 
as a result of SEA 483."46 And he made sure to point out that the 
"severity" of any burden imposed by the ID requirement "is, of 
course, mitigated" by the provisional ballot provision.47 In short, 
Crawford can (but need not) be read to suggest that, to prevail, 
voters would need to show that a challenged electoral restriction 
left them wholly unable to vote.48 
In Frank v. Walker, 49 Judge Easterbrook read Crawford to 
immunize ID measures so long as they did not render voters 
wholly unable to vote. He then found that the record in 
Wisconsin failed to show any voters for whom the ID measure 
proved to be an absolute bar to participation. 50 The Wisconsin 
law made voting more difficult for some voters, but, Judge 
Easterbrook emphasized, the Indiana law had facially done so as 
45 Id. at 187, 201. 
46 Crawford, 533 U.S. at 187, 201-02 (noting testimony from some witnesses, "none 
of whom expressed a personal inability to vote under SEA 483," from others who were 
still seeking to comply, from another who suggested he was "both" unwilling and unable 
to comply, and an affidavit from "one homeless woman who ... was denied a photo 
identification card because she did not have an address;" and observing "that single 
affidavit gives no indication of how common the problem is."). 
47 Id. at 199. 
48 See generally Ellen D. Katz, Withdrawal: The Roberts Court and the Retreat from 
Election Law, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1615 (2009). 
49 Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014). 
50 Id. at 746-47 (stating that trial court failed to identify "substantial numbers" of 
eligible voters who "tried to get a photo ID but [were] unable to do so;" that eight voters 
testified to various frustrating attempts, but "they did not testify that they had tried to 
get (birth certificates], let alone that they had tried but failed;" and that extensive 
findings "that the poor are less likely to have photo IDs than persons of average income" 
mirrored findings in Crawford that were "deemed ... an inadequate basis for holding 
Indiana's law unconstitutional"). 
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well. 51 Finding the Wisconsin and Indiana voter ID measures to 
be structurally similar in relevant respects, he concluded that 
Crawford "require[s] us to reject a constitutional challenge to 
Wisconsin's statute."52 
Judge Posner's subsequent dissent insisted the Wisconsin 
record made the showing Judge Easterbrook read Crawford to 
require plaintiffs to make; namely, it identified voters wholly 
unable to vote due to the voter ID measure.53 Judge Posner, 
however, did not think the invalidity of the Wisconsin statute 
hinged on such evidence. Crawford was distinguishable not 
simply because "not a single plaintiff" in that case "intend[ed] 
not to vote because of the new law" or "whom the law will deter 
from voting."54 As important was the fact that the Indiana 
measure was "less restrictive"55 in critical respects and hence 
less burdensome on voters. Judge Posner wrote, "Crawford ... 
does not resolve the present case, which involves a different 
statute and has a different record and arises against 
a background of a changed political culture in the 
United States."56 
All the courts that have ruled for the voting plaintiffs post-
Shelby County have agreed. For instance, the Sixth Circuit held 
51 Id. at 7 46. 
52 Id. at 751. 
53 Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 786, 796 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting) 
(noting that "eight persons testified that they want to vote ... but have been unable to 
obtain the required identification" and describing a voter unable to obtain a photo ID, 
"who voted in previous elections but will be unable to vote in the forthcoming November 
4 election" and "similar" testimony from other witnesses); see also Frank v. Walker, 17 F. 
Supp. at 854, 862 (describing testimony from "eight witnesses who intend to vote in 
Wisconsin elections but who do not currently possess a qualifying photo ID;" and 
refusing to stay order because "some of the named individual plaintiffs ... would be 
unable to vote during any election that occurred while the stay was in effect, as they lack 
a photo ID and have been unable to obtain a photo ID"); Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d at 
744, cert. denied, 83 U.S.L.W. 3615 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2015) (No. 14-803). 
54 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951-52 (7th Cir. 2007). 
55 Frank, 773 F.3d at 783-85 (Posner, J., dissenting) (noting that Indiana accepted 
more varieties of identification, allowed voters to vote absentee without submitting any 
identification at all, and provided a means for indigent voters to submit affidavits 
"confirming their identity and indigence" rather than requiring them to obtain the 
necessary identification documents). 
56 Id. at 792 (Posner, J., dissenting) (stating that obtaining photo ID may involve 
"significant" rather than "negligible" costs and noting "[t]o encounter 'obstacles that have 
prevented or deterred' persons from obtaining a photo ID means either having tried but 
failed to obtain a photo ID or having realized that (for these persons) the obstacles to 
obtaining it were insurmountable, so there would be no point in trying to overcome 
them"). 
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that plaintiffs did not need to present "proof that there was no 
possibility [they] would find a way to adjust and vote through 
the remaining options."57 Similarly, the district court in Veasey 
v. Perry58 observed that "Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that 
any particular voter absolutely cannot get the necessary ID or 
vote by absentee ballot under SB 14," but made clear that "such 
an extreme burden is not necessary."59 
Whether the Supreme Court agrees is uncertain, as it 
declined review in Frank v. Walker. 60 What is clear is that Judge 
Easterbrook's approach rests on a distinction-between 
regulations that burden a right and those that completely deny 
it-that finds no parallel in the marriage cases leading to 
Obergefell. Some courts characterized same-sex marriage bans 
as barring entirely the right to marry,61 but the success of the 
marriage plaintiffs after Windsor never hinged on whether bans 
on same-sex marriage were better understood to deny the right 
completely or instead to burden it significantly. 62 Indeed, bans 
on same-sex marriage did not deny same-sex couples all the 
benefits of marriage, at least in jurisdictions that authorize civil 
unions or domestic partnerships.63 These arrangements were 
57 See Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 543-44 (6th Cir. 
2014); see also Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 434 F.Supp.3d 808, 840-41 
(S.D. Ohio 2014) (holding inability to predict whether reduction in EIP voting period 
"will actually reduce voter turnout . . . is not determinative of the Equal Protection 
analysis. Rather, the question is whether a burden has been imposed on the 
fundamental right to vote"). 
58 Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 
2014). 
59 See id. at *43. 
60 Frank v. Walker, No. 14-803, 2015 WL 131119, at *l (U.S. Mar. 23, 2015). 
61 See, e.g., Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1081 (10th Cir. 2014) ("Oklahoma has 
barred all same-sex couples ... from the benefits of marriage"); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 
F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014) (Virginia's marriage laws "prevent same-sex couples from 
marrying" and "exclude[e] same-sex couples from marriage"); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 
456, 478 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Idaho and Nevada's marriage laws ... preventO same-sex 
couples from marrying"); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 472 (E.D. Va. 2014) 
("[U]nder Virginia's Marriage Laws, Plaintiffs and Virginia citizens similar to Plaintiffs 
are deprived of that right to marry."). 
62 See, e.g., Bishop, 760 F.3d at 1080 ("State bans on the licensing of same-sex 
marriage significantly burden the fundamental right to marry."); Schaefer, 760 F.3d at 
377, 384 (alternatively describing same-sex marriage ban to "prevent same sex couples 
from marriage, to '"significantly interfere' with a fundamental right" and to "impede the 
right to marry"). 
63 See, e.g., Latta, 771 F.3d at 467 (Domestic partners are "like married couples for 
purposes of rights and responsibilities, including with respect to children, under state 
law"). Compare Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1001 (D. Nev. 2012), rev'd and 
remanded sub nom, with Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Except as 
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nevertheless held insufficient to alleviate the burden same-sex 
marriage bans impose. 
B. Supporting State Interests and the Relevance of Evidence 
Like the marriage plaintiffs, the voting plaintiffs have 
argued that the interests that States offer to justify the 
challenged regulations are insufficiently weighty and poorly 
advanced by the regulations at issue. They have secured a 
number of favorable rulings on point, but all have been stayed or 
reversed, and, here too, the merits' reversal deemed the state 
interests at issue adequate.64 The voting plaintiffs have run into 
resistance when presenting evidence that undermines the state 
interests offered to justify challenged electoral restrictions. The 
marriage plaintiffs, by contrast, successfully undercut state 
justifications by either presenting evidence running counter to 
them or emphasizing the absence of evidence that supports 
them.65 This absence of supporting evidence not only diminished 
the asserted state interests but also contributed to more 
rigorous review of the burden same-sex marriage bans imposed 
and the motivation behind their enactment. 
After Windsor, courts were notably unimpressed with the 
interests states claim same-sex marriage bans advanced. They 
rejected the idea that same-sex marriage bans protect 
procreative marriage as "grossly over- and under-inclusive;"66 
they dismissed as "wholly illogical" the idea that permitting 
same-sex marriage destabilizes or otherwise damages 
otherwise provided in the statutes, domestic partners in Nevada have the same rights 
and responsibilities as spouses have."); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 658 (7th Cir. 
2014) (domestic partnerships provide "some spousal benefits" but not "the right to adopt 
children jointly; spousal·support obligations, the presumption that all property of 
married couples is marital property; and state-mandated access to enrollment in a 
spouse's health insurance plan"). 
64 See infra notes 84 & 89-90 and accompanying text. 
65 See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. 
66 Baskin, 766 F.3d at 661, 672 (discussing why reliance on traditional marriage to 
"channel[ ] procreative sex" is both over and under inclusive); Bishop, 760 F.3d at 1080 
(rejecting "arguments based on the procreative capacity of some opposite-sex couples" on 
narrow tailoring grounds); Schaefer, 760 F.3d at 383, 384 ("[E]xclud[ing] same-sex 
couples from marriage due to their inability to have unintended children makes little 
sense."); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1221 (10th Cir. 2014) ("[A]ppellants cannot 
assert procreative potential as a basis to deny marriage rights to same-sex couples."); 
Latta, 771 F.3d at 472 ("[S]tates give marriage licenses to many opposite-sex couples who 
cannot or will not reproduce ... but not to same-sex couples who already have children 
or are in the process of having or adopting them."). 
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"traditional" marriage;67 and they discarded as flatly 
impermissible the preference that children grow up in families 
headed by a female parent and a male parent. 68 They turned 
back state pleas for more time to assess whether same-sex 
marriage might yield negative effects, finding an absence of such 
effects in states that have legalized the practice as sufficient 
grounds to reject a wait-and-see approach.69 And they denied the 
State's interest in regulating marriage pursuant to popular or 
majority-held values, when they have understood that interest 
as failing to protect minority rights. 10 
In the voting cases, States have argued primarily that 
challenged electoral restrictions are needed to prevent voter 
fraud and to foster voter confidence in the electoral system. In 
Crawford, the Supreme Court held these interests to be 
sufficient to support the imposition of voter ID, despite the 
absence of evidence that either in-person voter fraud had 
occurred in the jurisdiction or that the measure actually fostered 
confidence or participation. 71 
67 See Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1223 ("[I]t is wholly illogical to believe that state 
recognition of the Jove and commitment between same-sex couples will alter the most 
intimate and personal decisions of opposite-sex couples"); Latta, 771 F.3d at 476 (noting 
that "[w]hen same-sex couples are married, just as when opposite-sex couples are 
married, they serve as models of loving commitment to all"); see also DeBoer v. Snyder, 
973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 773 (E.D. Mich. 2014) ("[T]radition and morality are not rational 
bases for the [Michigan Marriage Act]."). 
68 Schaefer, 760 F.3d at 384 (rejecting "optimal childrearing argument" as 
overbroad, and lacking "congruity"); Latta, 771 F.3d at 4 71 (calling this rationale "a 
categorically inadequate justification for discrimination"); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 
2d 632, 653-54 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (rationale "presumes that same-sex couples cannot be 
good parents-this is the same type of unconstitutional and unfounded presumption that 
the Supreme Court has held 'cannot stand"'); see also DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 
404-05 (6th Cir. 2014) (observing that "gay couples, no less than straight couples, are 
capable of raising children and providing stable families for them"). 
69 Baskin, 766 F.3d at 668 (finding no basis to think that "heterosexual" marriage" 
has been "transformed" in Massachusetts where same-sex marriage had long been legal). 
70 Latta, 771 F.3d at 474 (noting need to "protect minorities from oppression by 
majorities"); Baskin, 766 F.3d at 671 (stating that "[m]inorities trampled on by the 
democratic process have recourse to the courts; the recourse is called constitutional 
law"); Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, No. 3:14-CV-818-CWR-LRA, 2014 WL 6680570, 
at *32 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 25, 2014) ("Edith Windsor was not told to send a strongly worded 
letter to her Congressman."). But see DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 406 (holding that the issue 
should be resolved by the political process). 
71 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 196-97 (2008) (''The record 
contains no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its 
history."); see also Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (observing that "[v]oters who 
fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel 
disenfranchised"). 
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Several lower courts have nevertheless demanded 
supporting evidence for both claims. For instance, the district 
court in Frank u. Walker gave the State's interest in preventing 
voter fraud "very little weight," because "voter-impersonation 
fraud does not occur in Wisconsin," was only "theoretically 
imaginable," and, thus, was "unlikely ... [to] become a problem 
in Wisconsin in the foreseeable future." 72 Similarly, in Veasey u. 
Perry, the district court found that instances of in-person voting 
fraud were rare in Texas and that the State's ID measure was so 
ill-suited to preventing such fraud that the court disputed the 
State's claim that concerns about fraud actually motivated 
the measure. 73 
Likewise, in Ohio State Conference of NAACP. u. Husted, 74 
the district court doubted Ohio's claim that reduced 
opportunities for early in person (EIP) voting and the 
elimination of "golden week" advanced the State's interest in 
fraud prevention.75 An earlier registration period, the court 
observed, would provide the State the time it said it needed to 
verify registrations, while eliminating additional days for EIP 
"does not withstand logical scrutiny."76 And an appellate court 
rejected North Carolina's contention (and the district court's 
finding) that the elimination of same day registration (SDR) was 
necessary to promote electoral integrity and prevent fraud, 
finding "nothing in the district court's portrayal of the facts 
72 Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 847-48, 850, 852 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (stating 
that "a person would have to be insane to commit voter-impersonation fraud" given the 
penalties that could result and the unclear benefits that could be achieved, and finding 
neither evidence nor plausible reason why the contested measure might block illegal 
voting by felons and noncitizens). 
73 Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258, at *53, *55 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 
9, 2014) (noting that state legislature opted not to mitigate measure's effect on specific 
voters and racial minorities, despite ability to do so without hindering the measure's 
anti-fraud rationale, and that "[d]efendants did not provide evidence that the 
discriminatory features of SB 14 were necessary to accomplish any fraud-prevention 
effort" or that they led "to any increased voter confidence or voter turnout"); see also 
Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 11-12 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding that Texas 
"did not begin" to show that aspects of the measure that disproportionately burdened 
minority voters were "necessary to prevent fraud or increase public confidence in the 
electoral process"). 
74 Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808, 844 (S.D. Ohio 
2014). 
75 See id. 
76 See id. ("[T]he potential for fraud identified ... exists whether voters are allowed 
to register and vote on the same day or not, and is best combatted by election officials 
following the law and applicable procedures and not counting absentee votes prior to the 
proper verification of registration."). 
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suggests that those are anything other than merely 
imaginable."77 Invoking the district court's decision in Frank u. 
Walker, 78 the appellate court held that "states cannot burden the 
right to vote in order to address dangers that are remote and 
only 'theoretically imaginable.'"79 
Lower courts have also disputed state claims that 
challenged electoral restrictions foster voter confidence and 
participation. In Frank, the district court cited survey data 
collected soon after Crawford that suggested that voter ID 
measures do not contribute to either voter confidence or voter 
participation.80 Noting an absence of contrary evidence in 
Wisconsin, the court held that the State's voter ID measure 
"does not further the State's interest in promoting confidence in 
the electoral process" and might, in fact, "undermine the public's 
confidence in the electoral process" by keeping eligible voters 
from voting and thus making electoral results less reflective of 
the will of the people.s1 
The district court in Veasey likewise noted that "nothing in 
the evidence linked ... SB 14 with voter confidence," and 
suggested the measure "would likely decrease voter confidence" 
by preventing "fully qualified, registered voters" from voting in 
person and either "relegat[ing them] to the less reliable mail-in 
ballot" or preventing them from voting entirely. The court held 
that the "state interest in running elections in a manner that 
instills confidence ... is not served by the overly strict terms of 
SB 14."82 
77 League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 246 (4th Cir. 
2014). 
78 Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843 (E.D. Wis. 2014). 
79 League of Women Voters of N.C., 769 F.3d at 246 (quoting Frank, 17 F.Supp.3d at 
850 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33 (1968))). 
80 See Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d. at 834; see also Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel 
Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the 
Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1760 (2008) 
("This lack of empirical support leads us to conclude that, at least in the context of 
current American election practices and procedures, public perceptions do not provide a 
firm justification for voter identification laws."). 
81 Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d. at 852. 
82 Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258, at *47 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 
2014); see also Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating 
that "[t]he greatest threat to public confidence in elections in this case is the prospect of 
enforcing a purposefully discriminatory law, one that likely imposes an unconstitutional 
poll tax and risks denying the right to vote to hundreds of thousands of eligible voters"). 
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The appellate court in Frank nevertheless concluded that, 
under Crawford, the state interests in preventing voter fraud 
and fostering voter confidence sufficed to justify Wisconsin's 
voter ID measure. While "voter impersonation is rare if not 
nonexistent," Judge Easterbrook noted that the absence of fraud 
did not undermine the anti-fraud rationale in Crawford, and 
hence concluded it should not in other cases either.83 The court, 
moreover, characterized the maintenance of voter confidence as 
a "legislative fact" that lower courts could not revisit after 
Crawford, notwithstanding either an absence of supporting 
evidence or the existence of empirical evidence to the contrary.84 
Judge Posner disagreed. 85 He had previously observed that 
"voting fraud impairs the rights of legitimate voters,''86 but by 
Frank was no longer convinced that it did. Judge Posner wrote 
that the absence of evidence showing in-person voting fraud to 
be a problem meant that the prevention of such fraud neither 
justified nor motivated the disputed measure.87 He likewise 
noted evidence that voter ID does not promote voter confidence, 
adding that, even had polling data suggested otherwise, "it 
would imply a massive public misunderstanding, since requiring 
a photo ID in order to be permitted to vote appears to have no 
effect on election fraud."88 
83 Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 750 (7th Cir. 2014) (making this claim and adding 
that a photo ID requirement "deters fraud (so that a low frequency stays low)" and 
promotes other interests); see also Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett, No. 2:13-cv-224 at 14 
(E.D. Tenn. Feb. 20, 2014), available at http: //www.scribd.com/doc/208815196/TN-
Opinion-on-Voter-ID, archived at http://perma.cc/E5EU-8ZRH ("Plaintiff's allegations of 
Tennessee's lack of empirical evidence of in-person fraud or that requiring photo 
identification will reduce it are irrelevant."). 
84 Frank, 768 F.3d at 749-50 (arguing that better record-keeping, like voter 
confidence, were not issues open to reconsideration after Crawford-''in our hierarchical 
judicial system a district court cannot declare a statute unconstitutional just because he 
thinks (with or without the support of a political scientist) that the dissent was right and 
the majority wrong"). 
85 Frank, 773 F.3d at 795, 784-85 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
88 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951-52 (7th Cir. 2007). 
87 Frank, 773 F.3d at 796 (Posner, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the quest for 
partisan advantage best explained the measure). 
88 See id. at 794-95 (noting that the Ansolabehere and Persily article showed that 
"perceptions of voter impersonation fraud are unrelated to the strictness of a state's 
voter ID law" and that therefore, "[i]f perceptions of the prevalence of voter-
impersonation fraud are unaffected by the strictness of a state's photo ID laws, neither 
will confidence in the honesty of elections rise, for it would rise only if voters were 
persuaded that such laws reduce the incidence of such fraud"). 
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Here, too, the Supreme Court's view is uncertain. Back in 
Crawford, the Justices found the State's interest in preventing 
voter fraud and fostering voter confidence sufficient to uphold a 
voter ID measure on its face in a case that presented no evidence 
of a fraud problem that demanded a solution or empirics to 
support the causal claim asserted between voter ID and voter 
confidence.89 Still, Justice Stevens's plurality opinion found the 
record in the case wanting in numerous respects and new or 
additional evidence might illuminate not simply the burden 
plaintiffs alleged but the nature of state interests asserted. The 
denial of review in Frank leaves this question unresolved.90 
What is clear is that the Court left standing an appellate 
opinion that upholds state interests with willful blindness to the 
evidence undermining these interests. That stance, and the 
support Crawford offers for it, contrasts with the approach 
taken in the marriage cases, in which proffered state interests 
largely collapsed under examination in most lower courts that 
reviewed the issue. These interests have collapsed, moreover, 
not simply as a derivative consequence of judicial findings that 
same-sex marriage bans burden the right to marry, but instead 
as standalone findings that themselves contributed to the 
analysis of the burden imposed. In other words, the absence of 
evidence supporting the state interests in the marriage cases 
illuminated not only the weakness of the state interests 
asserted, but also propelled more searching analysis of the 
burden imposed by the bans and the motivation behind them. 
The voting plaintiffs have similarly prevailed when lower 
courts have been willing to probe the state interests asserted in 
defense of challenged electoral regulations and treat the absence 
of supporting evidence for them as probative. Judges who did so 
concluded that this lack of empirical support rendered the state 
interests themselves insubstantial, a finding that buttressed 
and propelled their conviction that the burden imposed was 
consequential and the motivation underlying the 
regulation suspect. 
None of these voting decisions are presently in effect. Much 
like the distinction between complete bans and significant 
burdens on a fundamental right, empirical support (or the lack 
89 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 194-97 (2008). 
90 Frank v. Walker, No. 14-803, 2015 WL 131119, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2015). 
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thereof) is playing a different role in the voting disputes than it 
played in the marriage cases. 
II. DEFERENCE AND DISCRIMINATORY INTENT 
After Windsor, courts examined same-sex marriage bans 
with considerable rigor. They viewed the burden imposed to be 
significant, notwithstanding the availability of civil unions and 
domestic partnerships, and they have refused, in the main, to 
defer to state interests offered in defense of the bans, deeming 
either the absence of supporting evidence or the existence of 
contrary evidence fatal to the validity of the state interests 
invoked. By contrast, what appears to be the dominant approach 
in the voting cases accords far more deference to state action. 
Alleged burdens dissipate in light of either the prospect of 
participation or the availability of other, less desirable 
mechanisms to cast a ballot; state interests, meanwhile, 
withstand scrutiny in the absence of empirical grounding and 
even in the face of undermining evidence. 
This variation in deference may stem from the belief that 
bans on same-sex marriage involved a more troublesome sort of 
discrimination.91 Animus was widely seen to underlie same-sex 
marriage bans, while more calculated, instrumental goals are 
thought to propel the voting restrictions. Less deference may 
have been accorded in the marriage cases because animus-based 
discrimination is seen to be the more severe form of 
discrimination. This Part first describes and then challenges 
this claim. 
91 Seven years ago, Judge Posner suggested that deferential review of voter ID was 
appropriate because the dispute was one in which "the right to vote is on both sides of 
the ledger." Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(2008) (stating that "voting fraud impairs the rights of legitimate voters to vote by 
diluting their votes"). That idea was always controversial, and by Frank, Judge Posner 
was no longer convinced by it. See Frank, 773 F.3d at 792, 796 (Posner, J., dissenting) 
(disputing notion that voter ID measures advance voting rights). The ledger image fails 
to explain the lesser deference accorded in the marriage cases, given that fundamental 
rights are as readily apparent on "both sides of the ledger" in those cases as they ever 
were in the voting arena. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing state 
claim that same-sex marriage bans are necessary to protect the integrity of traditional 
marriage). 
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A. Gradations of Discriminatory Intent 
The marriage plaintiffs could have displaced same-sex 
marriage bans without presenting any evidence that the state 
officials involved acted with discriminatory intent; similarly, the 
voting plaintiffs could prevail without establishing 
discriminatory intent.92 In both contexts, however, the plaintiffs 
have pressed the claim that discriminatory intent propelled the 
regulations they challenge. As discussed below, various 
marriage decisions that reached the issue explicitly found 
animus, while the sole voting decision that found discriminatory 
intent did not. 
In the marriage cases, courts addressing the issue of 
discriminatory intent repeatedly found that same-sex marriage 
bans were motivated by animus.93 These decisions noted, inter 
alia, that "this law is motivated by animus;"94 that it has no 
purpose "other than to effect pure animus;"95 that these laws 
"single out" same-sex couples for disfavored treatment;96 that 
"disparagement of. . . sexual orientation" is "implicit in the 
denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples,"97 and that 
withholding the term "marriage" had "no justification other than 
bigotry."98 The "clear primary purpose and practical effect of the 
marriage bans ... [is] to disparage and demean the dignity of 
same-sex couples in the eyes of the State and the 
wider community."99 
92 Proof of such intent is not an essential element of the VRA Section 2 injury, see 42 
U.S.C. § 1973 (proscribing conduct that "results" in a denial or abridgment of the right to 
vote); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986), nor is it necessary to establish a 
Fourteenth Amendment injury grounded either in the deprivation of a fundamental 
right, see, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1, 12 (1967), or an irrational state action. See e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 
1181, 1207, 1215 (D. Utah 2013) (finding marriage law invalid under rational basis 
review). 
93 But see Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014) (Holmes, J., 
concurring) (citing "considerations [that] cut strongly against a finding of animus"); 
DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 773 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (declining to ascribe 
animus as the motivation of the "the approximately 2. 7 million voters who approved the 
measure"). 
94 Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1163 (S.D. Ind. 2014). 
95 De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 646, 662-63 (W.D. Tex. 2014). 
96 See, e.g., Baskin, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 1163; Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 2014 
WL 6680570, at *34 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 25 2015). 
97 See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 658 (7th Cir. 2014). 
98 See id. at 670. 
99 See Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 995 (S.D. Ohio 2013); see also 
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Compare this narrative to the account of state action in the 
sole voting dispute to produce a finding of intentional race 
discrimination. In Veasey, '00 Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos found 
that Texas's voter ID provision, while facially neutral as to race, 
disproportionately burdened African-American and Hispanic 
voters and that this racially disparate impact was the ''but-for" 
reason the State adopted the measure. '0 ' Applying the Village of 
Arlington Heights u. Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corporation102 framework for determining whether 
discriminatory intent is a motivating factor for a facially neutral 
law, 103 Judge Ramos noted the irregular process by which the 
State adopted the measure; the legislature's awareness of SB-
14's racially disparate impact; and, most critically, the 
legislature's decision to reject amendments that would have 
mitigated that impact without hindering advancement of the 
fraud prevention goals SB-14 purported to promote. 104 Judge 
Ramos concluded that the evidence "demonstrates that 
proponents of SB 14 within the 82nd Texas Legislature were 
motivated, at the very least in part, because of and not merely in 
spite of the voter ID law's detrimental effects on the African-
American and Hispanic electorate."105 
Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 476 (9th Cir. 2014) ("The official message of support ... in 
favor of opposite-sex marriage ... necessarily serves to convey a message of disfavor 
towards same-sex couples and their families."); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 
481 (E.D. Va. 2014) (finding basis to suspect prejudice and finding that "moral 
condemnation" of homosexuality "continues to manifest in Virginia in state-sanctioned 
activities" ); Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1044-45 (S.D. Ohio 2014); Latta v. 
Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1080 (D. Idaho 2014) (finding that "moral disapproval of 
homosexuality was an underlying, animating factor" for same-sex marriage ban). 
Some judges and commentators have argued that it is unnecessary and even "unwise" to 
resolve allegations of discriminatory intent in the marriage cases, given the speed at 
which views on same-sex marriage have evolved, the damage caused by accusations of 
bigotry, and the difficulties that inhere in assessing voter intent. See, e.g., Bishop v. 
Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1096-97 (10th Cir. 2014) (Holmes, J., concurring); Wolf v. Walker, 
986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1009 (W.D. Wis. 2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 
1140-41, 1146-47 (D. Or. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1236 (10th Cir. 
2014) (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Brief of Amici Curiae 
Steven G. Calabresi, Daniel 0. Conkle, Michael J. Perry, & Brett G. Scharffs In Support 
of Certiorari and Opposing a Ruling Based on Voters' Motivations at 5-6, 11, Herbert v. 
Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014) (No.14-124). 
'
00 Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WO 5090258 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014). 
101 Id. at *48, *56, *58. 
102 See Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
103 See id. at 265; see also Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
104 Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 3d, at 699-703. 
105 Id. at *703; see also Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 11-12 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (Texas "did not begin to demonstrate that the Bill's discriminatory features 
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Judge Ramos went on to explain why the Texas Legislature 
designed its voter ID measure to burden African-American and 
Latino voters. The opinion states that lawmakers recognized 
that "Republicans in Texas ... facing a declining voter base ... 
[could] gain partisan advantage by suppressing the 
overwhelmingly Democratic votes of African-Americans and 
Latinos."106 Judge Ramos accordingly credited evidence that 
documented "intentional discrimination against minorities to 
achieve a partisan political advantage."107 
Notice that this finding of intentional racial discrimination 
never mentions "animus" or "bigotry." One can debate whether 
those terms might appropriately be used to describe official 
conduct that seeks to burden a racially-defined group because of 
its partisan affiliation. 108 But Judge Ramos decidedly avoided 
that characterization. (Judge Posner also avoided these terms, 
when, in Frank, he offered a similar explanation for the 
proliferation of measures like voter ID.) 109 For Judge Ramos, the 
were necessary" and that "[o]n this plain evidence, the District Court concluded that the 
Bill would not have been enacted absent its racially disparate effects"). 
106 Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 3d, at 700. 
107 Id. at 658. 
108 There is also debate among some commentators as to whether partisan-infused 
electoral restrictions should be categorized to involve racial discrimination at all. See, 
e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363, 1394 (2015) (suggesting that 
"the category of race increasingly fails to capture the primary motivation for what has 
become a battlefield in partisan wars"). These commentators urge what my colleague 
Sam Bagenstos describes to be a "universalist" approach to voting rights, see Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After Shelby), 
123 YALE L.J. 2838 (2014), namely, one that focuses on the ways a disputed regulation 
may burden the right to vote rather than on the group or groups who are burdened by it. 
The idea is that voting claims grounded in universal terms are more likely to succeed, 
better promote core values, and thus serve more voters more effectively than more 
conventional civil rights terms. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination 
Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 121-23 (2013); Richard H. Pildes, Room for 
Debate: We Need a Broader Approach, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/02/24/is-the-voting-rights-act-still-
needed/we-need-a-broader-approach, archived at http://perma.cc/JU5W-JFEU; Richard 
L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts to Make it 
Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. 58, 58 n.2 (2014); see 
also Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting 
Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 701 (2006). Shaped by both strategic and normative 
considerations, the universalist's position does not-on my reading at least-insist that 
courts err when, as Judge Ramos did, they find racial discrimination under the Arlington 
Heights framework. 
109 Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
(observing that "a number of conservative states try to make it difficult for people who 
are outside the mainstream, whether because of poverty or race or problems with the 
English language, or who are unlikely to have a driver's license or feel comfortable 
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state action at issue stemmed from intentional racial 
discrimination, regardless of whether animus in the form of ill-
will toward African-American and Latino voters propelled the 
legislature to enact the voter ID measure that it did. In her 
view, a plan to burden a racial group for partisan gain sufficed. 
This account of state action differs from what was the 
prevailing narrative in the marriage cases that addressed 
intent. Both identify state action crafted to burden members of a 
defined group,110 and both categorize such action as intentionally 
discriminatory, but offer distinct reasons for why the state 
actors imposed the burdens at issue. Where Judge Ramos 
identified intentionally discriminatory conduct calculated to 
advance partisan goals, the marriage decisions identified similar 
conduct motivated by ammus and crafted to express 
that animus. 
B. Circumscribing Discrimination 
The line separating animus-based discrimination from the 
more calculated, instrumental discrimination Judge Ramos 
identified should be a distinction without a difference. Both 
types of intent capture state action crafted to impose significant 
and selective burdens on specific minority groups. Both operate 
inexorably as sources of long-term structural harm. Both are 
recent, but far from novel, manifestations of a long tradition of 
intentionally discriminatory state action motivated by animus, 
by partisan or otherwise strategic goals, and often by both. rn 
Gauging the relative damage caused by one or the other is a 
fraught, ahistorical and unproductive endeavor from which legal 
consequences ought not to follow. 
dealing with officialdom, to vote ... because if they do vote they are likely to vote for 
Democratic candidates"). 
110 Both accordingly differ from the longstanding, now discredited category of 
"benign" discrimination intended to benefit group members. See, e.g., Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469 (1989); United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 
144, 175 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part). 
111 J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE 
RESTRICTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 23~5 (1st ed. 
1974); see also Cary Franklin, Discriminatory Animus, in A Nation of Widening 
Opportunities: The Civil Rights Act at 50 (forthcoming Michigan Univ. Press); 
Issacharoff, supra note 107, at 1394 ("Black voting rights were antithetical to the status 
quo based on Jim Crow, but for more than one reason."). 
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And yet, the sense that animus-based discrimination is 
more damaging than more calculated discrimination may best 
explain why courts were more inclined to side with the marriage 
plaintiffs than they have been with the voting plaintiffs. When 
animus is suspected or explicitly found, as it was in the 
marriage cases, courts do not defer to state action even on issues 
unrelated to intent. Challenged regulations were seen to burden 
a fundamental right and state interests offered in support were 
deemed inadequate. More mixed results follow when animus is 
not understood to underlie the challenged state conduct. 
Deference to state action becomes more likely, the burdens 
challenged regulations impose tend to be minimized, and the 
state interests offered validated. 
This privileging of animus-based discrimination over other 
types of intentional discrimination may help explain why Judge 
Ramos' ruling-the sole finding to date of racially discriminatory 
intent in the post-Shelby County voting litigation-was quickly 
rendered inoperative by the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme 
Court. 112 Judicial willingness to allow implementation of a state 
law adjudicated to be the product of intentional racial 
discrimination was met with some surprise; 113 and yet, a good 
deal of intentionally discriminatory conduct had been allowed to 
proceed without remedy in recent years. 114 
Shelby County itself captures this stance and the 
accompanying judgment that not all conduct falling within the 
category of discriminatory intent is equally culpable. That 
decision left a key provision of the VRA inoperative, based, in 
part, on the finding that the discrimination documented in the 
2006 congressional record reauthorizing it was not as severe as 
the discrimination that first led Congress to enact the VRA. 115 
112 See Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014); Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890, 895 (5th 
Cir. 2014). 
113 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Dawn Patrol, SLATE (Oct. 19. 2014), available at 
http://www.slate.com/ articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/10/ ginsburg_s_disse 
nt_in_texas_ voter_id_la w _supreme_court_order.html ?wpsrc=sh_all_dt_tw _top, archived 
at http://perma.cc/JXJ3-Q29Y (''It appears to be unprecedented to let a law that was 
deemed racially discriminatory go into effect simply to avoid the risk of voter confusion 
and election administration inefficiency."). 
114 See Ellen D. Katz, Justice Ginsburg's Umbrella, in A Nation of Widening 
Opportunities: The Civil Rights Act at 50 (forthcoming Michigan Univ. Press). 
115 Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013) (noting the record evidence 
did not "showO anything approaching the 'pervasive,' 'flagrant,' 'widespread,' and 
'rampant' discrimination that faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly distinguished the 
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Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion, however did not 
dispute Justice Ginsburg's observation, made in dissent, that 
the record documented persistent and prevalent 
unconstitutional discrimination. 116 By immobilizing the 
statutory regime in the face of that recognized discrimination, 
Shelby County endorsed a distinction between overt 
discrimination of the extreme Jim Crow variety and the less 
brazen defiance of constitutional norms we see today. 
The voting and marriage cases decided after Windsor and 
Shelby County and before Obergefell suggest a similar 
distinction between types of intentional discrimination. By 
applying more rigorous review to state action when animus is 
suspected or identified, these decisions isolated animus-based 
discrimination for distinct condemnation and intimated that the 
more calculated discrimination of the sort Judge Ramos 
identified might not be cause for concern. 
As such, the decisions threaten a deeply consequential 
narrowing of actionable discrimination. The animus-based 
discrimination identified in the marriage cases between Windsor 
and Obergefell is increasingly scarce in arenas in which civil 
rights protections have been accorded for longer periods. Indeed, 
it is far from happenstance that same-sex marriage bans were 
analogized to the Jim Crow-era anti-miscegenation laws 
ultimately struck down in Loving v. Virginia. 117 The fight for 
marriage equality was said to resemble the early civil rights 
struggle against racial discrimination, 118 and the understanding 
covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation at that time"). 
116 See id. at 2639-43, 2646-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
117 See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 670 (7th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 
961 F. Supp. 2d. 1181, 1215 (D. Utah 2013) (finding State's arguments supporting same-
sex marriage ban to be "almost identical" to those made by Virginia in 1966 to defend 
interracial marriage ban and finding them "as unpersuasive as the Supreme Court found 
them fifty years ago"); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1027-28 (W.D. Wis. 2014) 
(rejecting as inadequate the prospect that voters might repeal same-sex marriage, noting 
that same prospect existed with regard to anti-miscegenation laws, and concluding that 
"a district court may not abstain from deciding a case because of a possibility that the 
issues raised in the case could be resolved in some other way at some other time"). 
118 See Steven G. Calabresi, Gay Marriage and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 14-51 (2013), at 16, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2509443, archived at http://perma.cc/C25M-GE52 (observing 
that "(s]tate laws that ban same sex marriage formally discriminate on the basis of sex 
in the same way that State laws that banned inter-racial marriage discriminated on the 
basis of race"); see also Campbell Robertson & Shaila Dewan, In Defiance on Gay 
Marriage, Alabama Sets Itself Far Apart, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2015), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/11/us/in-defiance-alabama-sets-itself-far-apart.html, 
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of same-sex marriage bans as explicit, animus-based 
discrimination comports with that view. 
But animus of the Jim Crow sort captures only a portion of 
the conduct long understood to fall within the category of 
intentional discrimination.119 The suggestion that animus might 
define the category in its entirety is a new idea that caricatures 
historical practice and ignores the nature of the discriminatory 
practices that gave rise to modern civil rights laws in the first 
instance. In practice, it portends repudiation of the Arlington 
Heights framework by relegating actionable discrimination to 
what is regarded in the main as deviant behavior and 
immunizing the types of structural inequality that make 
calculated discrimination of the sort Judge Ramos identified 
attractive to state actors. 
III. DEFERENCE AND DIGNITY 
The sense that animus-based discrimination is distinctly 
culpable fuels the view that the marriage and voting cases are 
categorically different. In so doing, it obscures a central 
characteristic these cases may share. Bans on same-sex 
marriage are now widely seen to have inflicted a dignitary harm 
on same-sex couples. The voting restrictions challenged in the 
post-Shelby County litigation might be similarly understood, but 
that idea has yet to find application or even expression in the 
voting disputes. 
The idea of dignity pervaded arguments for same-sex 
marriage. The marriage plaintiffs made clear they sought not 
only the tangible benefits of marriage but "equal dignity for 
their marital aspirations."120 Windsor observed that marriage 
archived at http://perma.cc/9GJ6-BFEV (linking state Chief Justice's resistance to 
federal court order on same-sex marriage to George Wallace's infamous stand in the 
schoolhouse door opposing integration). 
119 See also Franklin, supra note 111 (criticizing use of Title VII "as a mechanism for 
policing outliers" and seeking "to engage in a new conversation--or really, reinvigorate 
an older conversation-about what constitutes discrimination under the law"). 
120 Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1199, 1207-08 (10th Cir. 2014); see also Bostic 
v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 368 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting plaintiffs' claim that "the 'inability 
to marry or have their relationship recognized ... with the dignity and respect accorded 
to married opposite-sex couples has caused them significant hardship"'); Bishop v. Smith, 
760 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (10th Cir. 2014) (plaintiffs "feel ... that marriage conveys a 
'level of commitment or respect' that is not otherwise available . . . [and] that their 
inability to marry under Oklahoma law is 'demeaning' and 'signals to others that they 
should not respect our relationship."'); DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 417 (6th Cir. 
2014) ("While these cases present a denial of access to many benefits, what is '[o]f 
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confers "a dignity and status of immense import,"121 and lower 
courts after Windsor repeatedly identified same-sex marriage 
bans to inflict dignitary harm on same-sex couples. 122 They, for 
instance, found that same-sex marriage bans "disparage[d] and 
demean[ed] the dignity of same-sex couples in the eyes of the 
State and the wider community;"123 they denied the children of 
same-sex couples "the recognition essential to ... dignity" and 
thereby prevented "those children from being recognized as 
members of a family by their peers;"124 they denied from same-
sex couples "respectability," labeled their families "as second-
class;" and "materially harm[ed] and demean[ed] same-sex 
couples and their children."125 The bans "humiliate[ed]"126 and 
prevented same-sex couples "from participating fully in our 
society."121 These injuries stemmed not from the denial of the 
tangible benefits marriage provides (and that a civil union or 
domestic partnership regime might offer) and arose instead 
because same-sex marriage bans denied same-sex couples the 
right "to publicly solemnize"128 their relationship in the way 
opposite-sex couples were allowed to.129 
greater importance' to the claimants, as they see it, 'is the loss of ... dignity and respect' 
occasioned by these laws''); Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759, 766 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 
14, 2014) ("[T)he plaintiffs aver as follows: ... 'that our family must suffer the indignity, 
stress, and stigma of not knowing whether or when our marriage will be recognized."'). 
121 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013). 
122 See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 658 (7th Cir. 2014) (providing equal 
access to marriage will "demonstrate[e] that homosexual married couples are in essential 
respects, notably in the care of their adopted children, like other married couples"); 
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1214 (10th Cir. 2014) ("[S]urely a great deal of the 
dignity of same-sex relationships inheres in the loving bonds between those who seek to 
marry and the personal autonomy of making such choices."); Henry v. Himes, 14 F. 
Supp. 3d 1036, 1060 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (stating that ban on same-sex marriage deprives 
"these families of . . [the] dignity that come with recognition of their marriages"); 
Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 981-82 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (noting "the harm 
Plaintiffs suffer when they lose ... the immensely important dignity, status, recognition, 
and protection of lawful marriage"); cf. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 417 (6th Cir. 
2014) (stating that "any loss of dignity and respect on this issue ... came from the 
neighborhoods and communities in which gay and lesbian couples live, and in which it is 
worth trying to correct the problem in the first instance"). 
123 Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 995. 
124 Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1215. 
125 Baskin, 766 F.3d at 658; Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 472-73 (9th Cir. 2014); 
Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, No. 3:14-CV-818-CWR-LRA, 2014 WL 6680570, at *2 
(S.D. Miss. Nov. 25, 2014). 
126 Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 478 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
127 Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014). 
128 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 407-08 (6th Cir. 2014). 
129 See, e.g., Schaefer, 760 F.3d at 377 ("[T)he choices that individuals make in the 
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An analogous injury might be seen to follow from many of 
the electoral restrictions challenged post-Shelby County. For 
instance, voters lacking compliant ID under various state ID 
measures need to "scrounge up a birth certificate,"130 make 
repeated trips to varied municipal and state offices, take time off 
from work, secure transportation, and pay consequential fees. 131 
Some of these voters may ultimately succeed in casting a ballot, 
but, to do so, they must first successfully perform a number of 
burdensome tasks that voters who already possess compliant ID 
for other purposes need not undertake, much less accomplish. As 
Judge Ann Claire Williams stated in dissent in Frank v. Walker, 
"the right to vote ... is not just held by those who have cars and 
so already have driver's licenses and by those who travel and so 
already have passports."132 Put differently, ID requirements do 
not simply make voting significantly more onerous for voters 
lacking qualifying ID, but they make it arduous in ways voters 
who already possess requisite ID for other purposes do 
not experience.133 
It is in this sense that the injury that results from voter ID 
laws resembles the dignity-based harm that same-sex marriage 
bans are now understood to inflict. The analogy is far from 
perfect, but it is sufficient to isolate an unexamined aspect of the 
injury many of the post-Shelby County voting regulations cause. 
Much like same-sex couples who were denied the ability to 
context of same-sex relationships enjoy the same constitutional protection as the choices 
accompanying opposite-sex relationships."); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1229-30 
(10th Cir. 2014) (noting "same sex [couples) are entitled to exercise the same 
fundamental right as is recognized for persons who wish to marry a person of the 
opposite sex"); Campaign for S. Equal., 2014 WL 6680570, at *14 (Banning same-sex 
marriage "serves to undermine the dignity of gay and lesbian citizens by suggesting that 
they are unworthy of sharing rights fundamental to every free person."); Wolf v. Walker, 
986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 988 (W.D. Wis. June 13, 2014) (Invalidating same sex marriage ban 
"merely affirm[s) that [same-sex] couples have rights to liberty and equality under the 
Constitution, just as heterosexual couples do."); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 
478 (E.D. Va. 2014) ("Plaintiffs honor, and yearn for, the sacred values and dignity that 
other individuals celebrate when they enter into marital vows in Virginia, and they ask 
to no longer be deprived of the opportunity to share these fundamental rights."); De Leon 
v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 659 (W.D. Tex. 2014) ("By denying Plaintiffs Holmes and 
Phariss the fundamental right to marry, Texas denies their relationship the same status 
and dignity afforded to citizens who are permitted to marry."). 
130 See Frank v. Walker, 769 F.3d 494, 498 (7th Cir. 2014) (Williams, J., dissenting); 
Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 796 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
131 See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258, at *21, *48 (S.D. 
Tex. Oct. 9, 2014). 
132 See Frank, 769 F.3d at 498 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
133 See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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solemnize their relationship as opposite-sex couples do and the 
public recognition that comes from doing so, 134 voters lacking 
compliant ID are denied both the ability to "vote without 
hindrance"135 as other voters are allowed to do and the public 
recognition that comes from the exercise of citizenship that 
voting in this manner represents. 
In both contexts, the resulting dignitary injury is premised 
on the idea that dignity emerges from performative acts and the 
recognition and respect law accords to them. 136 It is, thus, not 
happenstance that the marriage plaintiffs tended to be in long-
term, committed relationships, often raising children and 
participating in various civic-minded projects. Nor is it an 
accident that they challenged state laws that denied them the 
public recognition marriage provides and that is accorded to 
opposite-sex couples whether or not those couples presented 
themselves as the plaintiffs do. 137 Similarly, the voting plaintiffs 
are typically registered voters who have voted in numerous past 
elections and who now confront new voter ID requirements (or 
other measures) that transformed the act of participa6on into 
an ordeal. Whether or not these voters ultimately succeed in 
casting a ballot, they challenge electoral restrictions that impede 
their participation and compromise the recognition that comes 
from being able to cast a ballot unhindered as other voters 
can do. 138 
This dignitary harm, accordingly, is grounded more in 
equality than in liberty. 139 In both the marriage and voting 
134 See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1215 (10th Cir. 2014); Bostic v. 
Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 
995 (S.D. Ohio 2013). 
135 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 64 (1980). 
136 See JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK & RIGHTS 22 (2015); Katherine Franke, 
Dignifying Rights: A Comment on Jeremy Waldron's Dignity, Rights and Responsibilities, 
43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1177, 1178 (2011). 
137 See Franke, supra note 136, at 1197 (describing and evaluating how proponents 
of marriage equality have "mounted a ritualized performance of responsibilized 
citizenship . . . that [h]aving become recognizable as respectable, the court could 
recognize them as dignified, rights-bearing subjects and equal in rank to other 
(heterosexual) legal citizens"). 
138 See WALDRON, supra note 136, at 36 (observing that "although it is shared with 
millions of others the vote is not a little thing. It too can be understood in a more 
momentous way, as the entitlement of each person, as part of his or her dignity to an 
(equal) peer of the realm, to be consulted in public affairs"). 
139 Cf. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749 (2011) 
(describing "liberty-based" and "equality-based" dignity claims). 
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disputes, dignitary harm results from a selective denial of access 
to an institution on the same terms that others are granted. 140 
The injury derives from and builds upon the longstanding 
recognition that a "deprivation of personal dignity ... surely 
accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments."141 
Without doubt, recognition of a dignitary interest in the 
voting disputes presents difficulties not present in the marriage 
cases. As Justice Scalia recognized in Crawford, electoral rules 
necessarily "affectO different voters differently,"142 and elections 
could hardly be run if every differential impact gave rise to a 
cognizable dignitary harm, much less constitutional injury. Put 
differently, the prospect that electoral restrictions might inflict 
dignitary harms does not tell us which restrictions might do so 
and which do not. 
Developing a framework for such an inquiry lies beyond the 
scope of this Article, 14s but some preliminary principles might 
nevertheless be distilled. For instance, some electoral 
regulations will not implicate dignity interests at all, either 
because the burdens they impose are de minimus, or because the 
issues they regulate do not themselves touch on dignitary 
concerns. 144 Other regulations might implicate dignitary 
interests but advance goals that warrant their implementation 
despite the injuries they cause. Context is critical such that the 
same rule might implicate dignity concerns in one jurisdiction 
but not another. The failure, for instance, to provide early voting 
140 As such, the interest differs from the dignitary harm some suggest follows from 
facial race-based classifications. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 499, 517 (2000) 
(observing that "it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry 
instead of by his own merit"); Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that state 
mandated racial labels are inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society); see 
also BERNARD WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 230-49 (1976). 
141 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964). For 
recent disputes on public access and religious freedom, see, e.g., Daniel Roberts, Walmart 
CEO to Arkansas Governor: Veto 'Religious Freedom' Legislation, FORTUNE, Mar. 31, 
2015, available at http: //fortune.com/2015/03/31/walmart-ceo-asks-arkansas-governor-to-
veto-religion-legislation/, archived at http://perma.cc/P4GZ-9SJV; Walmart Newsroom, 
Our Statement on Arkansas #HB1228, TWITTER, (Mar. 31, 2015, 5:26 PM), 
https: //twitter.com/W almartNewsroom/status/583032659787 448320, archived at https: II 
perma.cc/WT6B-GUL2. 
142 See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 205 (2008) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
143 See Ellen D. Katz, Bringing Dignity (Back) to Voting (draft, on file with author). 
144 See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (upholding state ban on write-
in candidates). 
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does not facially raise a concern grounded in dignity, and yet the 
withdrawal of that option on terms that eliminate what was a 
vibrant form of participation for distinct communities of voters 
plausibly implicates a dignity interest. 145 So too, an ID rejected 
because the voter "recently grew a beard" might be dismissed, as 
Justice Stevens once suggested, as a minor inconvenience 
"arising from life's vagaries,"146 but such rejection also might 
inflict serious damage of a dignitary sort, for instance, to a 
transitioning transgender voter.147 
Context also helps illuminate the ways in which inequality 
is manifest in the electoral arena, such that a rule's facial 
neutrality should not obscure the dignitary harm it might 
inflict.148 Voter ID measures highlight this point but are just one 
example. Long wait times to vote in some precincts but not 
others raise concerns grounded in dignity, particularly when 
basic services are denied along the way. 149 
As has been widely observed, dignity is a particularly 
malleable concept, 150 such that "very different outcomes are 
145 See Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 558-59 (6th Cir. 
2014) (noting plaintiffs' evidence "that the eliminated EIP voting times are those that 
African Americans disproportionately use, and that racial inequalities in socioeconomic 
status and other factors make it much more difficult for African Americans to vote at the 
remaining times or through the other methods now available under the status quo as 
compared to other groups.") (emphasis in original); cf Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting 
Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1865, 1879-80 (2013) ("While the cutback of voting on the last weekend would be sure to 
inconvenience some voters and to put a kink in get-out-the-vote strategies, the move did 
not appear to be disenfranchising."). 
146 See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198 (plurality opinion). 
147 See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258, at *33 (S.D. Tex. 
Oct. 9, 2014) ("Mr. Ozias, who is in the process of changing his name, is registered to 
vote as Stephanie Lynn Dees. Mr. Ozias fears he will be turned away from the polls 
because, in his words, 'I don't really match my photograph and you always get people 
who just don't like transgender people ... "'). 
148 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 249 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (observing, in another context, that, "as everyone knows, this is an area in 
which evenhandedness is not fairness"). 
149 See Nicole Flatow, New Rule Prohibits Voters in Miami-Dade County from Using 
the Restroom, No Matter How Long the Line, THINKPROGESS (Apr. 10, 2014) available at 
http:l/thinkprogress.orgryustice/2014/04/10/3425252/new-rule-prohibits-voters-in-miami-
dade-county-from-using-the-restroom-no-ma tter-how-long-the-line/, archived at http: II 
perma.cc/JDY5-YQTC. 
150 See generally Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 169, 174-75, 177 (2011) (observing that "a single concept of dignity with fixed 
boundaries does not exist" while offering a typology to organize the ways in which the 
Supreme Court invokes dignity). 
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derived" from its application.151 The prominence of dignity in the 
debate over marriage equality nevertheless invites consideration 
of how dignity might find expression in connection with the right 
to vote, and a more detailed exploration of the shape that 
dignitary interest might take.152 
CONCLUSION 
The structural similarities between the voting and marriage 
cases that followed Windsor and Shelby County provide a lens 
through which ~o understand why their trajectories diverged. 
These similarities show courts giving greater deference to state 
action in the voting cases than in the marriage cases, despite 
evidence of intentional discrimination in both. The decisions 
accordingly suggest that courts see gradations within the 
category of intent-based discrimination and view some types of 
intent to be more problematic than others. Indeed, findings of 
animus in the marriage cases may have made the voting claims 
look weaker than they might have presented independently. 
While influence of this sort tends to be more atmospheric than 
direct and, accordingly, its very existence is necessarily 
speculative, the marriage cases isolated a type of intentional 
discrimination that may encourage, or perhaps even prompt, 
·some to dismiss the type of discrimination identified in Veasey v. 
Perry. 153 
One can imagine the marriage cases influencing the voting 
cases in a very different way. Their rejection of civil unions and 
domestic partnerships as substitutes for marriage was premised 
on the idea that same-sex couples should have the same right to 
marriage and the dignity it accords as opposite-sex couples 
enjoy. 154 That insight has application in the voting context, 
where new electoral restrictions deny some voters, invariably 
the poor and racial minorities, the ability to vote in 
circumstances that others enjoy as a matter of course. These 
151 See generally Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial 
Interpretation of Human Rights,19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 655, 698 (2008). 
152 See Katz, supra note 143. 
153 See Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2014). 
154 See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1229-30 (10th Cir. 2014) ("[T]hose 
who wish to marry a person of the same sex are entitled to exercise the same 
fundamental right as is recognized for persons who wish to marry a person of the 
opposite sex."). 
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voters are arguably denied the dignity that follows from having 
that opportunity. To date, however, dignitary interests have 
played no consequential role in the voting disputes and remain 
unlikely to gain traction so long as they remain obscured by the 
belief that animus captures the category of intentional 
discrimination in its entirety. 
